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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
WORKERS' RIGHTS 
Lance Compat 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) brings an important 
dimension to the global economy. CSR can enhance human rights, 
labor rights, and labor standards in the workplace by joining consumer 
power and socially responsible business leadership—not just 
leadership in Nike headquarters in Oregon or Levi Strauss 
headquarters in California, but leadership in trading house 
headquarters in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and leadership at the factory 
level in Dongguan and Shenzhen. 
Ten years ago, I would not have said this. I viewed corporate 
social responsibility and corporate codes of conduct as public relations 
maneuvers to pacify concerned consumers. Behind a facade of social 
responsibility, profits always trumped social concerns. CSR was only 
a fig leaf hiding abusive treatment of workers. 
But in recent years some concrete, positive results from 
effectively applied CSR programs convinced me of their value. In 
Mexico in 2001, workers at the Korean-owned KukDong sportswear 
factory succeeded in replacing a management and government-
dominated trade union with a democratic union of the workers' 
choice. Compliance officials from Nike and Reebok, two of the 
largest buyers, joined forces with the Fair Labor Association (FLA) 
and the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC) enforcing their codes of 
conduct to achieve this result. 
Important help also came from a Mexican non-governmental 
organization, the Worker Support Center (Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajadora, CAT), and from a Korean NGO, the Korea House of 
International Solidarity (KHIS). KHIS played a critical role by 
mediating and bridging the "culture gap" between the Korean 
management and Mexican workers. Independent evaluations by the 
t Senior Lecturer at Cornell University's School of Indsutrial and Labor Relations. This 
is a paper from a workshop on Corporate Social Responsibility sponsored by the Law School of 
Peking University and the Labor Law & Social Security Institute of Peking University, held in 
Beijing, January 13-15,2006. 
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International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and the monitoring group 
Verite also contributed to this positive outcome.1 
In Sri Lanka in 2003, I visited factories and trade union offices 
where workers enjoyed democratic unions with good collective 
agreements. Union representatives told me they achieved these goals 
thanks to intervention by brand name buyers implementing their 
codes of conduct with local factory managers. In one key case at the 
Jaqalanka Ltd. sportswear factory, collaboration among trade unions, 
the Sri Lankan NGO Center for Policy Alternatives, and the U.S.-
based Fair Labor Association contributed to workers' successful 
organizing efforts.2 
L TWENTY YEARS OF FAILURE 
I drew my earlier critical analysis from practice. In the mid-
1990s, twenty years of experience with corporate codes of conduct had 
shown few results. The Sullivan Principles of the 1970s and 80s, a 
code of conduct for U.S. firms in South Africa, had no apparent effect 
on the apartheid regime there. United States companies signed the 
Sullivan Principles out of concern with potential adverse reaction by 
consumers. Signing the Sullivan Principles allowed firms to continue 
profiting from operations in racist South Africa underneath a veneer 
of social responsibility. In the end, only strong international economic 
sanctions, backing the liberation struggle of the South African people, 
brought down the apartheid system.3 
In 1976, following dramatic exposes of American corporations' 
involvement in plots against the democratically-elected socialist 
government of Chile,4 major international agencies fashioned codes of 
conduct for multinational enterprises. The United Nations, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
1. See Jeff Hermanson, "Global Corporations, Global Campaigns: The Struggle for Justice 
at Kukdong International in Mexico," unpublished paper presented to Cornell seminar on labor 
revilatization, April 6, 2004 (on file with author); Jeremy Blasi, Kukdong: A Case of Effective 
Labor Standards Enforcement, " Henning Center for International Labor Relations, UC Berkeley, 
available at http://henningcenter.berkeley.edu/gateway/kukdong.html. 
2. See Centre for Policy Alternatives, Jaqalanka Limited and Free Trade Zone Workers 
Union (FTZWU) Dispute Settlement Process (Progress Report from Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, June 28, 2004), at http://www.cpaIanka.org/research_papers/Jaqalanka2.doc; 
Jaqalanka, Free Trade Zone Workers Union strike "fair labour" deal, DAILY MIRROR E-
EDITION, Dec. 11,2006, http://www.dailymirror.lk/2003/!0/22/ft/6.asp. 
3. See Jorge Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights through 
Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAMlNT'LLJ. 1 (1993). 
4. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings before the 
Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations (the 
"Church Committee"), 94th Cong., 1st sess., 381-86 (1975). 
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and the International Labour Organization (ILO) proposed 
declarations and guidelines to protect workers' rights, among other 
goals.5 
The United States blocked adoption of the UN code. The OECD 
adopted its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO 
adopted its Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises. However, these instruments had no 
apparent effect on corporate behavior. Complaints brought 
consultations among diplomatic "contact points," as they were called, 
But these officials took no action against companies that violated 
workers' rights. Indeed, complaints could not even be called 
"complaints." They had to be "requests for clarification" (OECD) or 
"requests for interpretation" (ILO), and "requesters" could not name 
the corporations that committed violations.6 
II. "EXTERNAL" AND "INTERNAL" CODES OF CONDUCT 
The Sullivan Principles and intergovernmental codes like those of 
the OECD and ILO can be called "external" codes of conduct. They 
were developed outside the corporation and presented to 
management for promises to comply with the code. They showed few 
results. However, civil society continued campaigning in the media to 
expose child labor, forced labor, deadly working conditions, 
assassinations of worker organizers and other abuses. These stories 
mobilized public opinion against corporations, requiring a new 
response. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several brand-name companies 
developed their own "internal" codes of conduct. Reebok, Levi's, 
Nike, J.C. Penney, and others, for example, announced that supplier 
firms in their global production chain would have to abide by their 
internal company codes or face loss of orders. The brands said they 
5. See Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, May 1983,23 
ILM 626 (1984); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (1976, updated in 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/department/ 
0,3355,en_2649_34889_l_l_l_l_l,00.html; International Labour Organization, Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf. For 
extended discussion, see David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" 97 
AM.J.INT'L.L.901(2003). 
6. See Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), A Users' Guide for Trade Unionists to 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.tuac.org/en/public/e-
docs/00/00/00/67/document_doc.phtml. 
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would take responsibility themselves for monitoring and enforcing 
their codes. 
Levi Strauss & Co. and Reebok Corp. were in the forefront of 
this movement for internal, corporate-sponsored codes of conduct. 
They reviewed the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
ILO Conventions, and other international human rights instruments 
in formulating their codes. They established monitoring and 
enforcement systems with detailed questionnaires on practices in 
foreign supplier plants, surprise visits by auditors, and reviews by 
company officials charged with enforcing the code.7 
III. T H E FOX AND HENHOUSE PROBLEM 
Levi's and Reebok did a good job implementing their internal 
codes of conduct. However, internal codes had inherent weaknesses. 
Sourcing from hundreds, even thousands of factories around the 
globe, even the most diligent CSR-conscious company could not 
guard against labor abuses in every one of its supplier factories. 
Critics could always find supplier plants with child labor, unsafe 
conditions, workers fired for trade union action, and even worse 
abuses. Exposes continued in the media, creating a strong impression 
of hypocrisy and failure of internal corporate codes of conduct.8 
Companies' monitoring and enforcing their own codes of conduct 
led inevitably to charges that the fox was monitoring the henhouse. 
Critics argued that management would sooner cover up abuses than 
expose them to public scrutiny. The demand for independent 
monitoring and verification, independent of corporate control, 
became irresistible.9 
7. For extensive discussion of the foregoing, see Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchiiffe-
Daricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Code of Conduct, 33 
COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 663 (1995). 
8. See, e.g., Robert Collier, Pressure Mounts on U.S. Apparel Industry; Saipan lawsuits 
boost drive for conduct code, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 15, 1999, at Al , available at 
http://www.sfgate.corn/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/arcliive/1999/02/15/MN20657.DTL; 
William J. Holstein et al., Santa's Sweatshop, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 16, 1996, at 
50, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztecli/articles/961216/arcliive_035166_7.htm. 
9. See Mark B. Baker, Private Codes of Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the Henhouse?, 24 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 399 (1993); Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and 
Product Labeling Schemes: The limits and possibilities of promoting international labor rights 
through private initiatives, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'LBUS. I l l (1998); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, 
From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at 
International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931 (Summer 2004). 
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IV. T H E NEW "STAKEHOLDER" CODES OF CONDUCT 
Today a new generation of codes called "multi-stakeholder" 
initiatives has appeared. Companies, unions, human rights groups, 
community and development organizations, and other NGOs 
participate in formulating a code of conduct. These multi-stakeholder 
codes of conduct on workers' rights contain provisions on monitoring, 
verification, certification of supplier factories, enforcement 
mechanisms, and transparency. Among the most prominent are the 
Fair Labor Association (FLA), Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), 
Social Accountability International (SAI), Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI), Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), and Worldwide Responsible 
Apparel Production (WRAP).10 
The differences among these groups are too detailed for this 
short paper. So are their often sharp rivalries, jealousies, and 
criticisms aimed at one another. Under some of these plans, 
monitoring, verification, and certification are carried out by Northern 
"social auditing" firms, some of them simply new divisions of 
traditional financial auditing companies like PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
In others, Southern non-governmental organizations are involved in 
code enforcement. The codes have different degrees of transparency 
and public reporting of their findings. Some contain "living wage" 
provisions, while others do not. 
Despite their differences, all these models create a dynamic of 
dialogue among brand-name buyers, factory managers, trade unions, 
NGOs, and other social actors. While some of the codes call for 
cancellation of purchasing contracts with supplier factories that 
violate the code of conduct, even these "hard" systems join their 
"soft" counterparts in seeking improvement and compliance, rather 
than cutting off business and hurting the workers they are trying to 
help. In fairness, such contract cancellation should only come after 
providing sufficient notice and opportunity for correction. 
V. PROBLEM: THE "NORTHERN" ANGLE 
One problem with CSR and codes of conduct is that they are 
mostly a Northern phenomenon. The Fair Labor Association, 
Worker Rights Consortium, and Social Accountability International 
have been fashioned and refined in Washington, D.G, and New York, 
10. See Web sites respectively at http://wwwiairlabor.org; http://www.workersrights.org; 
http://www.sa-intl.org; http://www.ethicaltrade.org; http://www.cleanclothes.org; 
www. wrapapparel .org. 
6 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 30:1 
not in Shanghai and Sao Paolo. The Ethical Trading Initiative and the 
Clean Clothes Campaign are driven from London and Amsterdam, 
not from Jakarta and Nairobi. 
To be effective, CSR needs involvement and commitment from 
developing country business leaders, trade unionists, and NGOs. This 
is not a reason to turn away from CSR models that have failed to 
involve them so far, or done so only partially. It is a reason to bring 
social actors in developing countries into the process of developing 
and strengthening CSR programs.11 
V I A FINAL CAUTION: C S R MUST SUPPLEMENT, NOT REPLACE, 
LABOR LAWS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
CSR is a valuable backstop when national governments falter at 
adopting and enforcing strong national and international labor 
standards. Governments cannot possibly inspect every workplace and 
catch every lawbreaker.12 CSR can also help when workers cannot 
help themselves through collective bargaining. Trade unions face a 
worldwide crisis of organizing and bargaining. Workers struggle, 
often against great odds, to build unions in many of the most 
"globalized" sectors of production and commerce such as agriculture, 
apparel, and electronics. They make some breakthroughs, but most 
workers in these sectors are still without organizations to defend them 
and bargain on their behalf. 
Codes of conduct offer a new way to advance workers' rights 
through private sector self-regulation using civil society vigilance, 
consumer buying power, and socially responsible business leadership. 
But human rights advocates and business promoters of CSR must 
keep their eyes open to a wider context. CSR can make valuable 
contributions to workers' rights, but CSR by itself is not enough. 
A platform stands on three legs. On one leg or two, it topples. 
CSR can only create a stable foundation for workers' rights with two 
other legs: 1) strong laws strongly enforced by government 
authorities, and 2) strong, democratic trade unions where workers can 
improve conditions though self-organization and collective bargaining. 
Focusing on CSR as the solution to workers' rights violations 
could undermine effective labor law enforcement by governmental 
11. A special edition of the Oxfam journal Development in Practice contains many articles 
speaking to these themes; see 14 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE issue nos. 1 & 2 (Feb. 2004). 
12. As U.S. labor law scholars and practitioners well know, this is true for the United States 
as well as for developing countries. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Unfair Advantage: Workers' 
Freedom of Association in the United States under International Human Rights Standards (2000), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslabor. 
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authorities and the representational role of trade unions. One may 
well ask: is the real goal of some corporate backers of codes of 
conduct the prevention of strong, class-based workers' organizations 
that can organize and bargain collectively, and participate in their 
country's political process to secure strong labor laws? Some 
companies might well prefer dealing with codes of conduct and weak, 
scattered NGOs rather than strong governments and unions. While 
NGO critics can mount publicity campaigns about abuses at single 
factories, consumers soon grow tired of repeated exposes. Only the 
most conscientious and alert consumers can sustain selective 
purchasing based on respect for workers' rights. 
A rush to corporate codes of conduct could allow powerful 
companies to avoid government regulation, union organizing, and 
enforceable collective agreements that uphold workers' rights and 
labor standards. Strong laws effectively enforced, along with self-
organization and collective bargaining, are the best sustainable ways 
to protect workers' rights. CSR and corporate codes .of conduct 
should be seen not as an alternative but as a supplement to labor law 
enforcement and collective bargaining. 
VII. DEMOCRATIC T R A D E UNIONS: T H E K E Y IN CHINA 
Corporate social responsibility programs and related codes of 
conduct now almost always include freedom of association, the right 
to organize, and the right to bargain collectively. For many companies 
and for many stakeholder codes seeking to implement CSR, the 
question of China's trade union monopoly under the All-China 
Confederation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) creates a threshold 
problem. 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has identified 
the ACFTU monopoly and its "transmission belt" role as violations 
that prevent "the establishment of trade union organizations that are 
independent of the public authorities and of the ruling party, and 
whose mission should be to defend and promote interests of their 
constituents and not to reinforce the country's political and economic 
system."13 The Committee on Freedom of Association has also 
deplored the use of criminal prosecutions against workers who protest 
abusive treatment, saying "the Committee deeply regrets the 
government's . . . perseverance in the punishment of acts related to 
13. See ILO, 310th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association (1998). 
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labor conflict with lengthy terms of imprisonment for acts of 
subversion on the basis of general and vague accusations."14 
Besides its relationship to government, the ACFTU also has a 
widespread practice of company managers, sometimes even human 
resources managers, holding trade union leadership posts. One officer 
of the Chinese employers' federation told researchers that trade 
unions are "just a branch of management" whose role is not so much 
to represent workers as to explain to workers why the company 
cannot increase their wages or why layoffs will help the company.15 
Another research group found that "Chinese unions function more as 
an offshoot of the Human Resources department, and are primarily 
concerned with supporting managerial interests."16 
Under international human rights standards and Conventions 87 
and 98 of the ILO, workers have the right to choose their own 
representatives from their own ranks. Neither the government nor 
the employer should tell them who their representatives must be. 
Moreover, company managers should not be trade union leaders. 
This perverts the very idea of trade unionism. A trade union's role is 
to present workers' demands to management, not management's 
demands to workers, 
This does not mean that trade unions cannot have strong ties to a 
governing political party or work cooperatively with management. 
The British Trades Union Congress (TUC) is organically linked to 
that country's Labour Party. So are the Swedish and German trade 
union centrals with each country's Social Democratic Party. In the 
United States, the AFL-CIO has a de facto relationship with the 
Democratic Party, with official positions in party leadership reserved 
for trade union officials. Among developing countries, the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has a similar tie to the 
African National Congress (ANC), and Argentina's General 
Confederation of Labor (CGT) is linked to the Peronist party. 
At the same time, these trade union bodies maintain an arms-
length distance from political parties. They collaborate with the 
parties whenever possible, but they also criticize them when 
necessary. In every case, the real test is whether workers themselves, 
through their chosen representatives, have freely decided to enter a 
14. See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, China (Case No. 2189), Report No. 333 
(April 2004). 
15. See Simon Clarke, Chang-Hee Lee & Qi Li, Collective Consultation and Industrial 
Relations in China, 42 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 235 (2004). 
16. See D. Ding, K. Goodall & M. Warner, The impact of economic reform on the role of 
trade unions in Chinese enterprises, 13 INT'L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 431-49 (2002). 
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relationship with the political party while maintaining independence 
from party control. 
A further test of trade union freedom is the existence of unions 
that choose not to ally themselves with a political party in or out of 
power, without suffering discrimination because of this choice. In 
each of the countries mentioned above, and in others where trade 
union-party alliances exist by workers' choice, there are also dissident 
unions opposed to political party platforms or to government policies. 
The right of these unions to freely function must be respected to fully 
afford workers' freedom of association. 
Unions must be independent of management as well as of 
government. But trade union principles do not prevent cooperation 
with management to improve productivity, quality, safety, and other 
marketplace goals in the context of a bargaining relationship that 
preserves workers' rights. Strong unions and strong managements can 
bargain their way to optimal outcomes that meet workers' needs while 
respecting the needs of the business. 
The challenge for CSR in China in the months and years ahead is 
to create new space for democratic trade union activity that comports 
with international human rights standards and ILO Conventions. A 
truly progressive CSR program should support the movement toward 
workers' democratic self-organization. CSR should not hold itself out 
as an alternative to trade unionism, but as an ally of trade unionism. 
Meeting this challenge is not just the responsibility of CSR 
officials from brand-name buyer firms and factory managers in 
supplier firms. Trade unionists, too, must take more responsibility for 
extricating themselves from government or management domination 
and taking the role of representing their members before government 
and management. This does not automatically mean confrontation 
with government or management. It means social dialogue and 
finding solutions through discussion, negotiation, and compromise. 
The ILO has strong capacity-building programs to help 
governments, employers, and unions achieve these goals. On the 
trade union side, so do the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) and the sectoral Global Union Federations 
(GUFs).17 On the employer side, the International Organization of 
Employers and its regional affiliates provide training for managers. 
Many university industrial relations programs similarly offer programs 
on collective bargaining skills, grievance handling, administration of 
17. In November 2006, the ICFTU merged with the World Confederation of Labor to form 
the new International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 
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collective agreements, and other aspects of labor-management 
relations. 
A reputation for good workplace practices and high labor 
standards can be a powerful "brand" asset for companies and for 
countries in the global economy. Labor rights advocates and "fair 
trade "-minded consumers should continue their calls for socially 
responsible production. On the business side, management 
throughout the supply chain, from top officials at firms' headquarters 
in the United States and other developed countries down to factory 
managers and supervisors in supply facilities in China and other 
developing countries, should nurture CSR to its full potential. Full 
potential includes workers' rights to organize and to bargain 
collectively to improve their working conditions. 
J 
